Realizability with Stateful Computations for Nonstandard Analysis by Dinis, Bruno
Realizability with Stateful Computations for
Nonstandard Analysis
Bruno Dinis
Faculdade de Ciências, University of Lisbon, Portugal
bmdinis@fc.ul.pt
Étienne Miquey
ÉNS de Lyon, Université de Lyon, LIP, France
etienne.miquey@ens-lyon.fr
Abstract
In this paper we propose a new approach to realizability interpretations for nonstandard arithmetic.
We deal with nonstandard analysis in the context of intuitionistic realizability, focusing on the
Lightstone-Robinson construction of a model for nonstandard analysis through an ultrapower. In
particular, we consider an extension of the λ-calculus with a memory cell, that contains an integer
(the state), in order to indicate in which slice of the ultrapowerMN the computation is being done.
We shall pay attention to the nonstandard principles (and their computational content) obtainable in
this setting. We then discuss how this product could be quotiented to mimic the Lightstone-Robinson
construction.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a new approach to realizability interpretations for nonstandard
arithmetic. On the one hand, we deal with nonstandard analysis in the context of intuitionistic
realizability. On the other hand, we focus on Lightstone and Robinson’s construction of a
model for nonstandard analysis through an ultrapower [23].
Throughout the history of mathematics, infinitesimals were crucial for the intuitive
development of mathematical knowledge by authors such as Archimedes, Stevin, Fermat,
Leibniz, Euler and Cauchy, to name but a few (see e.g. [15, 4, 3]). In particular, in Leibniz’s
Calculus one may recognize calculation rules – sometimes called the Leibniz rules [24, 7, 10] –
which correspond to heuristic intuitions for how the infinitesimals should operate under
calculations: the sum and product of infinitesimals is infinitesimal, the product of a limited
number (i.e. not infinitely large) with an infinitesimal is infinitesimal, . . .
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In [35, 36] Robinson showed that, in the setting of model theory, it is possible to extend
usual mathematical sets (N, R, etc.) witnessing the existence of new elements, the so-called
nonstandard individuals. In this way, it is possible to deal consistently with infinitesimal
and infinitely large numbers via ultraproducts and ultrapowers, in a way that is consistent
with the Leibniz rules. Since the extended structures are nonstandard models of the original
structures, this new setting was dubbed nonstandard analysis.
These constructions are meant to simplify doing mathematics: notions like limits or
continuity can for instance be given a simpler form in nonstandard analysis. Later in the 70s,
Nelson developed a syntactical approach to nonstandard analysis, introducing in particular
three key principles: idealization, standardization and transfer [31]. The validity of these
principles for constructive mathematics has been studied in many different settings, in
particular, following some pioneer work by Moerdijk, Palmgren and Avigad [29, 30, 2] in
nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic, several recent works, inspired by Nelson’s approach,
lead to interpretations of nonstandard theories in intuitionistic realizability models [6, 8, 13, 9].
The very first ideas of realizability are to be found in the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov
interpretation [14, 17], which identifies evidences and computing proofs (the realizers).
Realizability was designed by Kleene to interpret the computational content of the proofs of
Heyting arithmetic [16], and was later extended to more expressive frameworks [11, 18, 20].
While the Curry-Howard isomorphism focuses on a syntactical correspondence between proofs
and programs, realizability rather deals with the (operational) semantics of programs: a
realizer of a formula A is a program which computes adequately with the specification that
A provides. As such, realizability constitutes a technique to develop new models of a wide
class of theories (from Heyting arithmetic to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory), whose algebraic
structures has been studied in [38, 22, 27].
With the development of his classical realizability, Krivine evidences the fact that extend-
ing the λ-calculus with new programming instructions may result in getting new reasoning
principles: call/cc to get classical logic [12, 20], quote for dependent choice [19], etc. In
this paper, we follow this path to show how the addition of a monotonic reference allows us
to get a realizability interpretation for nonstandard analysis. The realizability interpretation
proposed here can be understood as a computational interpretation of the ultraproduct
construction in [23], where the value of the reference indicates the slice of the product in which
the computation takes place. In particular, we obtain a realizer for the idealization principle
whose computational behaviour increases the reference in the manner of a diagonalization
process.
Outline
We start this paper by recalling the main ideas of the ultraproduct construction (Section 2)
and the definition of a standard realizability interpretation for second-order Heyting arithmetic
(Section 3). We then introduce stateful computations and our notion of realizability with
slices in Section 4. As shown in Section 5, this interpretation provides us with realizers
for several nonstandard reasoning principles. Finally, we discuss the possibility of taking a
quotient for this interpretation in Section 6.1 and we conclude the paper in Section 6.2 with
a comparison to related works and questions left for future work.
N.B.: due to the page limit, proofs sketches are given in the appendices.
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2 The ultrapower construction
The main contribution of this paper consists in defining a realizability interpretation to give
a computational content to the ultrapower construction of Robinson and Lightstone in [23].
We shall begin by briefly explaining how this construction works in the realm of model theory.
First, recall that an ultrafilter over a set I is a filter U ⊆ P(I) such that for any F ∈ P(I),
either F or its complement F are in U . For instance, the set of cofinite subsets of N defines
the so-called Fréchet filter, which is not an ultrafilter since it contains neither the set of
even natural numbers nor the set of odd natural numbers. Nonetheless, it is well-known
that any filter F over an infinite set I is contained in an ultrafilter U over I: this is the
so-called ultrafilter principle. An ultrafilter that contains the Fréchet filter is called a free
ultrafilter. The existence of free ultrafilters was proved by Tarski in 1930 [37] and is in fact a
consequence of the axiom of choice.
Given two sets V and I and an ultrafilter U over I, we can define an equivalence relation
∼=U over V I by u ∼=U v , {i ∈ I : ui = vi} ∈ U . We write V I/U for the set obtained
by performing a quotient on the set V I by this equivalence relation, which is called an
ultrapower.
Consider a theory T (say ZFC) and its language L, for which we assume the existence of
a modelM. The goal is to build a nonstandard modelM∗ of the theory T that validates
new principles. Let us denote by V the set which interprets individuals inM, and let us
fix a free ultrafilter U over N. Roughly speaking, the new model M∗ is defined as the
ultrapower MN/U . Individuals are interpreted by functions in VN while the validity of a
relation R(x1, ..., xk) (where the xi are interpreted by fi, for i ∈ {1, ..., k}) is defined by
M∗  R(f1, ..., fk) iff {n ∈ N :M  R(f1(n), ..., fk(n))} ∈ U .
We can now extend the language with a new predicate st(x) to express that x is standard.
Standard elements are defined as the ones that, with respect to ∼=U , are equivalent to constant
functions, i.e. M∗  st(f) if and only if there exists p ∈ N such that {n ∈ N : f(n) = p} ∈ U .
Formulas that involve this new predicate are called external, while formulas of the original
language L are called internal.
Lightstone and Robinson’s construction relies on the well-known Łoś ’ theorem [33] which
states that if ϕ is an internal formula (with parameters in VN), then M∗  ϕ if and only
{n ∈ N : M  ϕn} ∈ U , where ϕn refers to the formula ϕ whose parameters have been
replaced by their values in n. This construction indeed defines a model of T which satisfies
other relevant properties, namely transfer, idealization and standardization. As a consequence
of Łoś ’ theorem, to see that an internal formula ϕ(x) holds for all elements, it is enough
to see that it holds for all standard elements: this is the transfer principle. In our setting,
idealization amounts to a diagonalization process: it is for instance easy to see that if one
defines δ : n 7→ n (where we, with abuse of notation, write n for both the natural number n
and its interpretation in V), thenM∗  ∀x.(st(x) → x < δ). Finally, standardization is a
sort of “comprehension scheme” which states that we can specify subsets of standard sets by
giving a membership criterion for standard elements (by means of an internal formula).
3 Realizability in a nutshell
3.1 Heyting second-order arithmetic
We start by introducing the terms and formulas of Heyting second-order arithmetic (HA2),
for which we follow Miquel’s presentation [25]. Second-order formulas are build on top of
first-order arithmetical expressions, by means of logical connectives, first- and second-order
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quantifications and primitive predicates. We use upper case letters for second-order variables
and lower case for first-order ones. We use a primitive predicate Nat(e) to denote that e is a
natural number (0 then has type Nat(0) and the term s t has type Nat(S(e)) provided that t
has type Nat(e)). We consider the usual λ-calculus terms extended with pairs, projections
(written πi), injections (written ιi), case analysis, natural numbers and a recursion operator:
1st-order expressions e ::= x | 0 | S(e) | f(e1, . . . , en)
Formulas A,B ::= Nat(e) | X(e1, . . . , en) | A→ B | A ∧B | A ∨B
| ∀x.A | ∃x.A | ∀X.A | ∃X.A
Terms t, u ::= x | 0 | s | rec | λx.t | t u | (t, u) | π1(t) | π2(t)
| ι1(t) | ι2(t) | case t {ι1(x1) 7→ t1|ι2(x2) 7→ t2}
where f : Nn → N is any arithmetical function. We write Λ for the set of all closed λ-terms.
As in Miquel’s presentation, we consider formulas up to the following congruences:
(∃x.A)→ B ∼= ∀x.(A→ B) (∃X.A)→ B ∼= ∀X.(A→ B) (1)
These congruences allow us to avoid having elimination rules for the existential quantifiers,
thus simplifying the resulting type system. The type system, which is given in Figure 1,
corresponds to the usual rules of natural deduction. The reader may observe that we do not
give computational content to quantifications.
In the sequel, we make use of the following usual abbreviations:




¬A , A→ ⊥
e = e′ , ∀Z.(Z(e)→ Z(e′))
∀Nx.A , ∀x.(Nat(x)→ A)
∃Nx.A , ∃x.(Nat(x) ∧A)
It is well-known that the above definition of equality (often called Leibniz law) enjoys the usual
expected properties (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity) and allows to perform substitution of
equal terms. The quantifications ∀Nx.A and ∃Nx.A are often said to be relativized to natural
numbers.
The one-step (weak) reduction over terms is defined by the following rules:
(λx.t)u .β t[u/x] rec u0 u1 0 .β u0 rec u0 u1 (s t) .β u1 t (rec u0 u1 t)
π1(t, u) .β t π2(t, u) .β u case ιi(t) {ι1(x1) 7→ t1|ι2(x2) 7→ t2} .β ti[t/xi]
We write →β for the congruent reflexive-transitive closure of .β . The reduction →β is known
to be confluent, type-preserving and normalizing on typed terms [5].
3.2 Realizability interpretation of HA2
In this subsection we define the realizability interpretation of the type system defined in
Figure 1, in which formulas are interpreted as saturated sets of terms, i.e. as sets of closed
terms S ⊆ Λ such that t→β t′ and t′ ∈ S imply that t ∈ S. We write SAT to denote the set
of all saturated sets and, given a formula A, we call truth value its realizability interpretation.
I Definition 1 (Valuation). A valuation is a function ρ that associates a natural number ρ(x)
to every first-order variable x and a truth value function ρ(X), i.e. a function in Nk → SAT
to every second-order variable X of arity k.
1. Given a valuation ρ, a first-order variable x and a natural number n, we denote by
ρ, x 7→ n the valuation defined by (ρ, x 7→ n) , ρ| dom(ρ)\{x} ∪ {x 7→ n} .
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Γ ` 0 : Nat(0)
(0)
Γ ` s : ∀Nx.Nat(S(x))
(S)
Γ ` rec : ∀Z.Z(0)→ (∀Ny.(Z(y)→ Z(S(y))))→ ∀Nx.Z(x)
(rec)
(x : A) ∈ Γ
Γ ` x : A
(Ax)
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx . t : A→ B
(→I )
Γ ` t : A→ B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` t u : B
(→E)
Γ ` t : A Γ ` u : B
Γ ` (t, u) : A ∧B
(∧I )
Γ ` t : A ∧B
Γ ` π1(t) : A
(∧1E)
Γ ` t : A ∧B
Γ ` π2(t) : B
(∧2E)
Γ ` t : A
Γ ` ι1(t) : A ∨B
(∨1I )
Γ ` t : B
Γ ` ι2(t) : A ∨B
(∨2I )
Γ ` t : A1 ∨A2 Γ, xi : Ai ` ti : C
Γ ` case t {ι1(x1) 7→ t1|ι2(x2) 7→ t2} : C
(∨E)
Γ ` t : A[x := n]
Γ ` t : ∃x.A
(∃1I )
Γ ` t : ∀x.A
Γ ` t : A[x := n]
(∀1E)
Γ ` t : A x /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ` t : ∀x.A
(∀1I )
Γ ` t : A[X(x1, . . . , xn) := B]
Γ ` t : ∃X.A
(∃2I )
Γ ` t : ∀X.A
Γ ` t : A[X(x1, . . . , xn) := B]
(∀2E)
Γ ` t : A X /∈ FV (Γ)
Γ ` t : ∀X.A
(∀2I )
Γ ` t : A′ A ∼= A′
Γ ` t : A
(∼=)
Figure 1 Type system.
2. Given a valuation ρ, a second-order variable X of arity k and a truth value function
F : Nk → SAT, the valuation defined by (ρ,X 7→ F ) , ρ| dom(ρ)\{X} ∪ {X 7→ F} will
be denoted by ρ,X 7→ F .
We say that a valuation ρ is closing the formula A if FV (A) ⊆ dom(ρ).
I Definition 2 (Realizability interpretation). We interpret closed arithmetical expressions e in
the standard model of first-order Peano arithmetic N. Given a valuation ρ and a first-order
expression e (whose variables are in the domain of ρ) we denote its interpretation by JeKρ.
The interpretation of a formula A together with a valuation ρ closing A is the set |A|ρ defined
inductively according to the following clauses:
|Nat(e)|ρ , {t ∈ Λ : t→β sn0, where n = JeKρ}
|X(e1, . . . , en)|ρ , ρ(X)(Je1Kρ, . . . , JenKρ)
|A→ B|ρ , {t ∈ Λ : ∀u ∈ |A|ρ.(t u ∈ |B|ρ)}
|A1 ∧A2|ρ , {t ∈ Λ : π1(t) ∈ |A1|ρ ∧ π2(t) ∈ |A2|ρ}
|A1 ∨A2|ρ , {t ∈ Λ : ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. case t {ι1(x1) 7→ x1|ι2(x2) 7→ x2} ∈ |Ai|ρ}
|∀x.A|ρ ,
⋂
n∈N |A|ρ,x7→n |∀X.A|ρ ,
⋂
F :Nk→SAT |A|ρ,X 7→F
|∃x.A|ρ ,
⋃
n∈N |A|ρ,x7→n |∃X.A|ρ ,
⋃
F :Nk→SAT |A|ρ,X 7→F
Observe that in the previous definition, the universal quantifications cannot be seen as
generalized conjunctions. Indeed, the conjunction is given computational content through
pairs, while the universal quantifications are defined as intersections of truth values.
It is easy to see that for any formula A and any valuation ρ closing A, one has |A|ρ ∈ SAT.
As it turns out, the congruences defined by Equation (1) are sound w.r.t. the interpretation.
I Proposition 3 ([25]). If A and A′ are two formulas of HA2 such that A ∼= A′, then for all
valuations ρ closing both A and A′ we have |A|ρ = |A′|ρ.
In order to show that the realizability interpretation is adequate with respect to the type
system we need the following preliminary notions.
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I Definition 4 (Substitution). A substitution is a finite function σ from λ-variables to
closed λ-terms. Given a substitution σ, a λ-variable x and a closed λ-term u, we denote by
(σ, x := u) the substitution defined by (σ, x := u) , σ| dom(σ)\{x} ∪ {x := u}.
I Definition 5. Given a context Γ and a valuation ρ closing the formulas in Γ, we say that
a substitution σ realizes ρ(Γ) and write σ  ρ(Γ) if dom(Γ) ⊆ dom(σ) and σ(x) ∈ |A|ρ for
every declaration (x : A) ∈ Γ.
I Definition 6. A typing judgement Γ ` t : A is adequate if for all valuations ρ closing A
and Γ and for all substitutions σ  ρ(Γ) we have σ(t) ∈ |A|ρ. More generally, we say that an
inference rule
J1 · · · Jn
J0 is adequate if the adequacy of all typing judgements J1, . . . , Jn
implies the adequacy of the typing judgement J0.
I Theorem 7 (Adequacy [25]). The typing rules of Figure 1 are adequate.
I Corollary 8. If Γ ` t : A is derivable, then it is adequate.
The adequacy theorem is the key result when defining realizability interpretations in that
fundamental properties stem from it. For example, we have the following corollary.
I Corollary 9 (Consistency). There is no proof term t such that ` t : ⊥.
We would like to point out that the proof of adequacy is very flexible. Indeed, if one
wants to add a new instruction to the language of terms via its typing rule, it is enough to
check that this typing rule is adequate while the remainder of the proof is exactly the same.
3.3 Introducing value restrictions
The realizability interpretation of Definition 2 is also flexible regarding the set of formulas that
are interpreted. We illustrate this point here by introducing a new construction extending
formulas. For these formulas we shall not give any typing rule, instead we will see how
this construction allows us to enforce value restrictions, which will turn out to be crucial
afterwards in a setting where stateful computations occur. We start by defining the subset
V ⊆ Λ of values by the following grammar:
Values V ::= 0 | sV | λx.t | (V1, V2) | ιi(V )
Observe that variables are not values, otherwise the system would not be stable by substitution.
In the remainder of this paper, we adopt the convention that λ-terms are denoted by lowercase
letters t, u, ... while uppercase letters V,W, ... refer to values.
Distinguishing the set of values allows for instance to restrict the β-reduction rule to








V u .v V u
′
The reflexive transitive closure →v of the one-step reduction .v is known as the (left-to-right)
call-by-value evaluation strategy. While it is well-known that the reduction system of the
λ-calculus is confluent, so that the choice of a particular evaluation strategy does not have
any consequence in terms of expressiveness, this is no longer the case when side effects (such
as stateful computations in the next sections) come into play.
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To enforce value restrictions, let us now extend the language of formulas with a new
construction {A} 7→ B and the realizability interpretation accordingly by
|{A} 7→ B|ρ , {t ∈ Λ : ∀V ∈ |A|ρ.(t V ∈ |B|ρ)}
In particular, we have |{Nat(e)} 7→ B|ρ = {t ∈ Λ : t n ∈ |B|ρ, where n = JeKρ}. It is easy
to check that for any formulas A and B, |{A} 7→ B|ρ is a saturated set, and the adequacy of
the (∀2E)-rule is thus preserved.
While there is currently no rule to type a term t with a formula of the shape {A} 7→ B,
we can nonetheless extend the type system with any rule as long as it is adequate (see
Proposition 45). We can also extend, maintaining the adequacy of the interpretation of
{A} 7→ B (see Proposition 46), the congruence relation with the following rules:
{∃x.A} 7→ B ∼= ∀x.{A} 7→ B {∃X.A} 7→ B ∼= ∀X.{A} 7→ B
We will make use of the following abbreviations:
∀{N}x.A , ∀x.({Nat(x)} 7→ A) ∃{N}x.A , ∀X.(∀{N}x.(A→ X))→ X
While the first definition is natural, the second one may be a bit more puzzling at first
sight. As we saw, the truth value of any formula has to be a saturated set. However, given
a formula A(x), the set {(n, t) : t ∈ |A(n)|ρ} is not saturated, and so we cannot define a
formula ∃x.{Nat(x)} ∧A(x) whose realizers would be this set. Nonetheless, the definition of
∃{N}x.A is somehow doing the trick in continuation-passing style, in the sense that we have:
I Proposition 10. For any formula A, any valuation ρ and any term t, if t ∈ |∃{N}x.A|ρ then
there exists a natural number n ∈ N and a term u ∈ |A[x := n]|ρ s.t.: t (λxy.(x, y))→β (n, u).
I Definition 11. We define T , λzx.(rec (λy.y 0) (λxyz.y (λx.z (sx)))x) z.
The next proposition relates these new quantifications with the relativized quantifications
∀Nx.A and ∃Nx.A using the term T .
I Proposition 12. We have
1. T  ∀{N}x.A→ ∀Nx.A
2. λx.x  ∀Nx.A→ ∀{N}x.A
3. λz.z λxy.(x, y)  ∃{N}x.A→ ∃Nx.A
4. λxy.T y π1(x)π2(x)  ∃Nx.A→ ∃{N}x.A
The term T , which forces the evaluation of an argument of type Nat(n) to get the
underlying value n to make it compatible with a function ∀{N}x.A, is somehow simulating
a call-by-value evaluation (for natural numbers). Such a term is usually called a storage
operator [20].
While Proposition 12 indicates that the different ways of relativizing the quantifiers
are equivalent (in the sense that one admits a realizer if and only if the other does), it is
important to keep in mind that this result is peculiar to the current effect-free settings. In
particular, this result no longer holds once stateful computations are allowed.
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4 Realizability with slices
4.1 Stateful computations
The first step in the Lightstone-Robinson construction aims at getting a productMN of the
(initial) modelM. In order to achieve this goal in our setting, we add a memory cell to our
calculus that contains an integer, which we call the state. The purpose of the state is to keep
track of which “slice” of the product is the interpretation being done. This product allows us
to interpret first-order individuals as functions in NN, so that the interpretation accounts for
new elements – the so-called nonstandard elements – for instance the diagonal function (see
Proposition 30).
In our extended calculus, the first-order expressions are the same, while second-order
formulas now use a value restriction for natural numbers and include a predicate st(e), as
per usual in nonstandard analysis, denoting that the expression e is standard. This means
that in our framework we will also have two types of nonstandard quantifications: the usual
∀st,∃st and the relativised ∀{st},∃{st}x. We say that a formula is internal if it does not contain
the predicate st(·), and external otherwise. Terms are extended with two new instructions
get and set. The former allows to obtain the content of the current state while the latter
allows to increase its content. Formally, we extend the different grammars as follows:
Formulas A,B ::= st(e) | X(e1, . . . , en) | {Nat(e)} 7→ A | A→ B
| A ∧B | A ∨B | ∀x.A | ∃x.A | ∀X.A | ∃X.A
Terms t, u ::= ... | get | set
States S , N
Since the formulas no longer include an unrestricted constructor Nat(e), the typing rules
for 0, s and rec are no longer required1. Other than that, the type system is unchanged. In
particular, the get and set instructions are not given any typing rule. We will make use of
the following abbreviations:
∀stx.A , ∀x.(st(x)→ A)
∀{st}x.A , ∀x.(st(x)→ ({Nat(x)} 7→ A))
∃stx.A , ∃x.(st(x) ∧A)
∃{st}x.A , ∀X.((∀{st}x.(A→ X))→ X)
With the exception of the get / set instructions, the syntax of terms does not account
for states. In fact, only the reduction rule for the set instruction allows to change the
state. Nonetheless, states play a crucial role in the reduction system. In particular, one-step
reductions are now defined for terms together with a state. We write t .ss′ t′ to denote that
the term t in state s reduces to the term t′ in state s′. The one-step reduction over terms is




′ get .ss s
s′′ = max(s, s′)




where C[ ] ::= rec u0 u1 [ ] | [ ]u | πi([ ]) | case [ ] {ι1(x1) 7→ t1|ι2(x2) 7→ t2} | s [ ] | set [ ]u.
We write t s↓s′ t′ for the reflexive-transitive closure of this relation.
Since we now consider effectful computations, we have to fix an evaluation strategy in
order to ensure the confluence of the reduction system2. Here we follow a call-by-name
evaluation strategy (we substitute unevaluated arguments), while for rec and set one of their
arguments must be reduced.
1 In Proposition 29, we show how these terms define realizers for the value restricted natural numbers.
2 Observe that our definition for C[ ] ensures that our reduction system has no critical pair. We refer the
reader unfamiliar with side effects to Example 47, given in the appendices.
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4.2 Stateful realizability interpretation
The fact that our syntax now includes states allows us to interpret formulas as terms-with-
states3. Truth values are then defined as saturated sets in P(Λ×S). Individuals are now
individuals with states, so elements of NS, and similarly predicates of arity k are elements of
the set of functions from Nk to P(Λ×S). This creates a mismatch in the sense that predicates
are no longer shaped to be applied to individuals4. In order to define our interpretation,
we need to deal with this mismatch between the structure of individuals and the one of
predicates, by defining a suitable notion of application.
I Definition 13. Let F : Nk → P(Λ×S) be a predicate. We define the application of F to
individuals f1, . . . , fk ∈ NS by F@(f1, . . . , fk) , {(t; s) : (t; s) ∈ F (f1(s), . . . , fk(s))}.
I Definition 14. An individual f ∈ NS is said to be standard if it is a constant function,
i.e. if there exists n ∈ N such that ∀s ∈ S.(f(s) = n). We then write f = n∗.
I Definition 15. We define saturated sets with respect to the stateful reduction to be sets
S ∈ Λ ×S s.t. for any terms t, t′ ∈ Λ and any states s, s′ ∈ S, if (t′; s′) ∈ S and t s↓s′ t′
then (t; s) ∈ S. With abuse of notation we denote the set of these saturated sets by SAT.
In the realizability interpretation with slices below, truth values are defined as saturated
sets. This allows us to reason by anti-reduction (sometimes also called expansion) in any
fixed state. By anti-reduction, we mean that to show that a term t with a state s belongs to
such a saturated set S, it is enough to find s′ and t′ such that t s↓s′ t′ and (t′; s′) ∈ S.
We now consider valuations which are functions that associate a function in NS to every
first-order variable x and a truth value function from Nk to SAT to every second-order
variable X of arity k. Again, with abuse of notation we denote such valuation by ρ.
We also extend the usual interpretation of first-order expressions to range over NS. To
that end, we simply define arithmetical functions pointwise on the domain. For instance, if
f ∈ NS, we write S∗(f) for the function s 7→ (S(f(s))). When it is clear from the context,
we abuse the notation by writing 0, S, J·Kρ, etc. instead of 0∗, S∗, J·K∗ρ.
I Definition 16 (Realizability with slices). The interpretation of a formula A together with a
valuation ρ is the set |A|Sρ defined inductively according to the following clauses:
|st(e)|Sρ ,
{
Λ×S if JeKρ is standard
∅ otherwise
|X(e1, . . . , en)|Sρ , ρ(X)@(Je1Kρ, . . . , JenKρ)
|{Nat(e)} 7→ A|Sρ , {(t; s) ∈ Λ×S : (t n; s) ∈ |A|Sρ , where n = JeKρ(s)}
|A→ B|Sρ , {(t; s) ∈ Λ×S : ∀u.
(
(u; s) ∈ |A|Sρ ⇒ (t u; s) ∈ |B|Sρ
)
}
|A1 ∧A2|Sρ , {(t; s) ∈ Λ×S : (π1(t); s) ∈ |A1|Sρ ∧ (π2(t); s) ∈ |A2|Sρ
)
}
|A1 ∨A2|Sρ , {(t; s) ∈ Λ×S : ∃i ∈ {1, 2}.(case t {ι1(x1) 7→ x1|ι2(x2) 7→ x2}; s) ∈ |Ai|Sρ }
|∀x.A|Sρ ,
⋂
f∈NS |A|Sρ,x7→f |∀X.A|Sρ ,
⋂
F :Nk→SAT |A|Sρ,X 7→F
|∃x.A|Sρ ,
⋃
f∈NS |A|Sρ,x 7→f |∃X.A|Sρ ,
⋃
F :Nk→SAT |A|Sρ,X 7→F
We write (t; s)  A (resp. t  A) to denote that (t; s) ∈ |A|S (resp. ∀s ∈ S.(t; s) ∈ |A|S).
Realizers of the type t  A are called universal.
3 A realizability interpretation with a similar structure, although with a different notion of state, can be
found in [28]. The perspective of the latter is also different in that it aims at proving the normalization
of a classical call-by-need calculus.
4 This phenomenon also occurs in the Lightstone-Robinson construction of an ultrapower [23].
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Observe that this stateful interpretation has the structure of a product of the interpretation
given by Definition 2. The interpretation corresponding to a given state can thus be seen as
a slice of this product. However, it is important to keep in mind that the set instruction
still allows terms to change the value of the state, therefore the slices are not completely
independent. We write |A|sρ to denote the truth value {(t; s) ∈ |A|Sρ } in the slice induced
by s. We first verify that truth values are indeed saturated sets and that the interpretation
validates the congruence rules.
I Proposition 17. Let A be a formula and ρ a valuation closing A. Then |A|Sρ ∈ SAT.
I Proposition 18. If A and A′ are two formulas of HA2 such that A ∼= A′, then for all
valuations ρ closing both A and A′ we have |A|Sρ = |A′|Sρ .
We need to adapt a few definitions to prove the adequacy theorem in this setting.
I Definition 19. Given a context Γ, a state s and a valuation ρ closing the formulas
in Γ, we say that a substitution σ realizes ρ(Γ) in the state s and write (σ; s)  ρ(Γ) if
dom(ρ(Γ)) ⊆ dom(σ) and (σ(x); s) ∈ |A|Sρ , for every declaration (x : A) ∈ Γ.
I Definition 20. We say that a typing judgement Γ ` t : A is adequate w.r.t. a state s
in the stateful system if for any valuation ρ and any substitution (σ; s)  ρ(Γ) we have
(σ(t); s) ∈ |ρ(A)|. An inference rule is adequate w.r.t. a state s if the adequacy (w.r.t. s) of
all its premises implies the adequacy (w.r.t. s) of its conclusion.
We are now able to show that, with the exception of the (∀2E)/(∃2I)-rules, our rules are
adequate. The (∀2E)/(∃2I)-rules are shown to be adequate, for internal formulas only, in
Proposition 27.
I Theorem 21 (Adequacy). The typing rules of Figure 1, except the (∀2E)/(∃2I)-rules, are
adequate.
I Remark 22. Let us explain why the (∀2E)-rule is not adequate in general (the same argument
applies to the (∃2I)-rule). As emphasized at the beginning of this section, we interpret
predicates by functions from Nk to SAT, while the truth values of formulas may vary in
the set of functions from (NS)k to SAT. Theorem 26 will make this more precise: internal
formulas correspond to functions from Nk to SAT while external formulas correspond to
functions from (NS)k to SAT. Therefore, in general we cannot substitute a second-order
variable by any formula. Indeed, in the second-order elimination rule (for universal quantifiers)
variables can only be instantiated by internal formulas. Moreover, if the formula B that we
want to substitute is a proposition (i.e. if its arity k is equal to 0), then the substitution is
valid since the interpretations of internal and external formulas coincide. This means that
we could have chosen to work with impredicative encodings of the conjunction (or other
connectives) as in the Russell-Prawitz translation [34]. Indeed, such an encoding relies on
the use of propositions, which are thus compatible with the elimination rule:
A ∧B , ∀X.(A→ B → X)→ X A ∨B , ∀X.(A→ X)→ (B → X)→ X
We show that rec realizes a formula that emulates its former typing rule by using
quantifiers relativized with a value restriction.
I Proposition 23. We have rec  ∀X.X(0)→ ∀{N}x.(X(x)→ X(S(x)))→ ∀{N}x.X(x).
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I Remark 24. Regarding the necessity of restricting the relativization of quantifiers to
values, the proof of Proposition 23 is enlightening. Indeed, given a state s, two terms
(uS ; s)  ∀{N}y.(X(y)→ X(S(y))) and (u0; s)  X(0) and an individual f ∈ NS to instantiate
x, if instead of a value we were only given a term reducing to a value witnessing Nat(f), this
term may change the value of the state, say to some s′, before reducing to the value of f(s′).
This would break the proof since nothing is assumed on u0 and uS in this new state s′.
4.3 Glueing
An important property of our interpretation (which also reflects a similar property in the
Lightstone-Robinson construction) is that the interpretation of internal formulas can be
decomposed as the product of its slices. In other words, internal formulas can only access
information in the current state. In particular, and as expected, this means that it is
impossible to express standardness by means of internal formulas. To state this formally, we
first define the restriction of formulas and truth values with respect to a slice.
I Definition 25. Given an internal formula A, we define As as the formula whose individuals
are all applied in s. Formally, it amounts to replacing each individual by the standard
individual with which it coincides in the state s:
F (e1, ..., ek)
s
, F ((e1(s))∗, . . . , (ek(s))∗)
A→ Bs , As → Bs
{Nat(e)} 7→ B
s
, {Nat((e(s))∗)} 7→ Bs
A ∧Bs , As ∧Bs





The next result ensures that truth values of internal formulas can be split into slices.
I Theorem 26 (Glueing). For any internal formula A and valuation ρ closing A, we have
that (t; s) ∈ |A|Sρ ⇔ t ∈ |A
s|sρ.
Let B(x) be a formula whose only free variable is x, and ρ a valuation. In general, the
function FB that associates to any individual f the truth value |B(f)|Sρ is a function from
NS to SAT. If B is internal, by the glueing theorem, to determine FB it is enough to know
its value for standard individuals. This means that we only need to know a function from N
to SAT. As such, we can now formally state the intuition developed in Remark 22.
I Proposition 27. The elimination rule (∀2E) for the 2nd-order universal quantification and
the introduction rule (∃2I) for the 2nd-order existential quantification are adequate for any
internal formula B whose only free variables are (x1, ..., xk).
I Remark 28. Observe that external formulas such as st(x)→ ⊥ cannot be defined by glueing.
Consider for instance a nonstandard element τ . Then |st(τ)→ ⊥|S = Λ×S, while for any
state s ∈ S we have |st(τ)→ ⊥
s
|s = |st(τ(s)∗)→ ⊥|s = |> → ⊥|s = ∅.
It is well-known that the comprehension scheme CAB , ∃X.∀x.(X(x)⇔ B) is a logical
consequence of the elimination principle ElimBA , (∀X.A) ⇒ A[X(x) := B] (by taking
A = ∃Y.∀x.(Y (x) ⇔ X(x))). Since we have the (∀2E)-rule restricted to internal formulas
B, the comprehension scheme is also valid for these formulas. In particular, this implies
standardization for internal formulas, i.e. ∀stX.∃stY.∀stz.(Y (z)⇔ X(z) ∧B(z)) holds for B
an internal formula. The usual standardization scheme, formulated for all formulas, requires
further investigation and is left for future work. Of course, the comprehension scheme does
not hold for external formulas, so the relativization on the quantifiers in standardization is
in this sense necessary.
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5 Nonstandard principles in realizability with slices
5.1 Natural numbers
Observe that the language of HA2 does not express the existence of specific nonstandard
elements, e.g. δ is not in the language. However, to refer to some nonstandard element τ , we
can always consider a valuation that maps a variable x to τ . With abuse of notation, in the
remainder of this paper, we will write nonstandard elements directly in formulas as if they
were in the language. Also, we will use the notation † to refer to an arbitrary λ-term with
no further assumption.
In the stateful interpretation (Definition 16), we considered a value restriction to natural
numbers. Nonetheless, we can assert that an expression is a natural number through the
formula Nat′(e) , ∀X.({Nat(e)} 7→ X)→ X. It is easy to see, by an argument similar to
Proposition 10, that for any individual f ∈ NS, if t is a term such that (t; s) ∈ |Nat′(f)|S,
then t λx.x s↓s n where n = f(s). In other words, t is an effect-free term producing n. This
is to be compared with Nat(f), for which the requirement for its truth value to be saturated,
would have entailed its interpretation to reduce to a natural number f(s′) in a possibly
different state. We show that (by-value) natural numbers, i.e. Nat′, contain 0, and are closed
under the successor and recursion for internal formulas.
I Proposition 29. Let A be an internal formula.We have
1. λx.x 0  Nat′(0)
2. λxy.y (sx)  ∀{N}x.Nat′(S(x))





The interpretation now witnesses the existence of new elements. The canonical example
is the diagonal, i.e. the function δ : n 7→ n. Indeed, the diagonal is a nonstandard natural
number which is realized by the get instruction.
I Proposition 30. We have that
1. †  ¬st(δ)
2. †  ∃x.¬st(x)
3. λx.T x get  Nat′(δ)
4. λx.T x get †  ∃{N}x.¬st(x)
Part 2 in Proposition 30 is sometimes referred to as the ENS0 (existence of nonstandard
elements) principle [6]. As a consequence of Proposition 27, Leibniz equality is only compatible
with the (∀2E)-rule restricted to internal formulas. In our setting, this encoding only reflects
equality in the current state, i.e. a local knowledge of individuals (slice by slice), while the
usual notion of equality (for NS) requires a global knowledge (on all the slices). If A(x) is
an external formula, we cannot hope to have an internal definition of equality such that its
elimination principle x = y → A(x)→ A(y) is valid.
I Example 31. Consider an individual f , equal to 1 everywhere except for some state s0
where it is equal to 0. Then by considering the formula A(x) , (st(x)→ ⊥)→ ⊥, it is easy
to get a realizer of ⊥ out of any realizer of (∀Z.(Z(1∗)→ Z(f)))→ A(1∗)→ A(f).
Nonetheless, the elimination of Leibniz equality is realizable for standard individuals or
for internal formulas.
I Proposition 32. Let f and g be individuals in NS, then
1. For any formula A(x), λx.x  st(f)→ st(g)→ (∀Z.(Z(f)→ Z(g)))→ A(f)→ A(g)
2. If A(x) is an internal formula, then λx.x  (∀Z.(Z(f)→ Z(g)))→ A(f)→ A(g)
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5.2 Nonstandard reasoning principles
In this section, we prove some properties which are usual in frameworks that use nonstandard
analysis: transfer, overspill, external induction, idealization, etc.
Theorem 33 below indicates that the transfer property (for internal formulas) is devoid
of computational content. This is a somewhat reassuring fact: properties that are true for
standard individuals are automatically true for all individuals.
I Theorem 33 (Transfer). For any internal formula A we have:
1.
⋂
f∈NS |A|Sx 7→f =
⋂
n∈N |A|Sx 7→n∗
2. λxy.x  ∀x.A(x)→ ∀stx.A(x)
3. λx.x †  ∀stx.A(x)→ ∀x.A(x)
4.
⋃
f∈NS |A|Sx 7→f =
⋃
n∈N |A|Sx 7→n∗
5. λx.(†, x)  ∃x.A(x)→ ∃stx.A(x)
6. λx.π2(x)  ∃stx.A(x)→ ∃x.A(x)
As expected, transfer does not hold for all formulas. A counter-example is given in the
next proposition by the external formula stating that all individuals are (not not) standard.
I Proposition 34. Let A(x) be the formula ¬st(x). The formulas ∀stx.¬A(x)→ ∀x.¬A(x)
and ∃x.A(x)→ ∃stx.A(x) have no realizer.
The principle of external induction [32] allows to prove that a certain property is valid
for all standard natural numbers, for instance, that every nonstandard element is larger than
all standard natural numbers5. We show that in our context, this principle can be realized
using the rec instruction.
I Proposition 35 (External induction). For any formula A(x) whose only free variable is x
rec  A(0∗)→ ∀{st}x.(A(x)→ A(S(x)))→ ∀{st}x.A(x).
The next two propositions, show that one cannot separate standard natural numbers from
nonstandard natural numbers using an internal formula [36]. We first show that overspill
can be realized by combining the realizers for ENS0 and for the transfer principle.
I Proposition 36 (Overspill). For any internal formula A, we have
λx.(x †, †)  ∀stx.A(x)→ ∃x.(¬st(x) ∧A(x)).
The usual proof of underspill is by contradiction, hence using classical logic, which we do
not have here. Nevertheless, we can obtain the following version in which a double-negation
occurs.
I Proposition 37 (Underspill). For any internal formula A, we have
λxy.(λz.y (†, z))(x †)  (∀x.¬st(x)→ A(x))→ ¬¬∃stx.A(x).
5 Actually, this requires to consider a quotiented definition of the standardness predicate, see Proposi-
tion 42.
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5.3 Idealization
We first extend the realizability interpretation to take into account relations R : N2 → N on
the natural numbers:
|R(e1, e2)|Sρ , {(t; s) : R(Je1Kρ(s), Je2Kρ(s)) holds}
This coincides with the interpretation of the relation R through a second-order variable and
the corresponding semantic relation from N2 to SAT in the interpretation.
Let us now briefly illustrate the main idea behind the proof of idealization by showing
that there exists a (nonstandard) natural number greater than or equal to any standard
number. The usual proof relies on the fact that δ is such a number, since for any standard
number n, in any slice greater than or equal to n, the relation n ≤ δ holds. In our setting,
we use the set instruction to reach such a state.
I Proposition 38 (Diagonalization). We have λz.T z get (λxy. set y †)  ∃{N}x.∀{st}y.y ≤ x.
I Remark 39. Consider a term loop+ such that for any state s ∈ S, loop+ s↓s incr loop+
where incr , λx. set (s get)x. Observe that loop+  ∀stx.x < δ where the quantifier does
not need to be relativized since the value of x is not required. Yet, the computation never
terminates and we do not even know when the computation reaches a correct state.
As mentioned above, the idea to prove the general case of idealization is very similar. If
for any n ∈ N there exists τn ∈ N such that for any m ≤ n, R(τn,m) holds, we can consider
the nonstandard natural number τ , (τs)s∈S ∈ NS. As shown by the following lemma, we
can compute τ from any realizer of ∀{st}n.∃{st}x.∀{st}y.(y ≤ n→ R(x, y)).
I Lemma 40. For any formula A, any valuation ρ, any state s and any term t such
that (t; s) ∈ |∃{st}x.A|Sρ , there exists a natural number n ∈ N and a term u such that
(u; s) ∈ |A|Sρ,x 7→n and t (λxyz.(y, z)) s↓s (n, u).
The term ideal , λx.λy.T y (π1(T (x †) get (λwyz.(y, z)))) (λyz. set z y) is a realizer for
the idealization principle. Indeed, in any state s the first component of ideal computes τ(s),
using Lemma 40, while the second component increases the state to ensure the validity of
the relation (as in Proposition 38).
I Theorem 41 (Idealization). ideal  ∀{st}n.∃{st}x.∀{st}y.(y ≤ n → R(x, y)) →
∃{N}x.∀{st}y.R(x, y)
6 Conclusion and future work
6.1 Towards a quotient
In order to fully mimic Lightstone and Robinson’s construction, an extra step would be
required where one would take a quotient of the interpretation with slices. The study of
such an interpretation is outside the scope of this paper6. Let us nevertheless comment on a
possibility. Fix a free ultrafilter U over the set of states. Given any set V , let us denote by
∼= the equivalence relation over V S defined by f ∼= g , {s ∈ S : f(s) = g(s)} ∈ U .
First, we can, within the realizability with slices, change the way st(f) is interpreted to
consider standardness up to the ultrafilter. In this way, f ∈ NS is said to be standard if and
only if there exists n ∈ N s.t. f ∼= n∗. As a consequence, we for instance get that:
6 We leave it for future work, but more details sketching this construction are given in Appendix C.
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I Proposition 42. λxy.loop+  ∀x, y.¬st(x)→ st(y)→ y < x
We then need to define a new notion of realizability in which realizers are also considered
up to the equivalence relations induced by U . To that end, a natural attempt consists in
considering Łoś ’ theorem as a guideline. For the sake of clarity, let us denote by |A|∗ the
truth values in this interpretation, which we shall call realizability up to U .
I Definition 43. We say that a formula A is Łoś -reducible if for any valuation ρ closing A,
t ∈ |A|∗ if and only if {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ |A|Sρ } ∈ U .
We actually define the interpretation of connectives by this equivalence (e.g., we define
|A → B|∗ρ , {t ∈ Λ : {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ |A → B|Sρ } ∈ U , }) while the interpretation of
the quantifiers is still defined via intersections (resp. unions) over the same domain as in
the interpretation with slices (e.g., |∀x.A|∗ρ ,
⋂
f∈NS |A|∗ρ,x7→f ). As shown in the following
theorem, first-order quantifiers behave well with respect to the ultrafilter.
I Theorem 44 (Łoś ’ theorem). First-order internal formulas as well as arbitrary disjunctions,
conjunctions and implications are Łoś -reducible.
Theorem 44 implies that if a term t is a realizer of a first-order internal formula A “often
enough” in the interpretation with slices, then t is still a realizer in the interpretation up
to U . Since all the realizers in Section 5 were universal, they are still realizers in this new
setting, meaning that all the results from that section remain valid in the interpretation up
to U . In particular, Theorem 44 applies to transfer, idealization, overspill or underspill.
A simple example illustrating this new interpretation is the formula ∀stx.x < δ, which was
realized by loop+ in the interpretation with slices and is now realized by any term (because
for any n ∈ N, the set of states such that n < δ is equal to [n; +∞[ which belongs to U).
Similarly, loop+ can be replaced by † in Proposition 42.
However, this construction is still prospective and it raises several questions. On the
one hand, such a definition is not as compositional as one usually expects in realizability.
Indeed, while we have that |A→ B|∗ρ ⊆ {t : ∀u ∈ |A|∗ρ.t u ∈ |B|∗ρ} for any internal formulas
A and B and any valuation ρ, this inclusion is strict in general (see Remark 52) . In other
words, we can compose a realizer t ∈ |A→ B|∗ρ with a realizer in u ∈ |A|∗ρ to get t u ∈ |B|∗ρ,
but the (→I)-rule is not adequate when considering substitutions of variables by realizers in
the quotiented truth values. More generally, such a definition does not exactly match the
intuition of the quotient in the Lightstone-Robinson construction, just like the interpretation
with slices does not exactly define a product due to the ability to change the state via set.
On the other hand, the interpretation up to U is indeed a new and more flexible inter-
pretation in that it allows us to get realizers for principles that were inaccessible in the
interpretation with slices (e.g., ∀x, y.¬st(x)→ st(y)→ y < x). We would like to determine
whether it allows us to realize other, more involved, nonstandard reasoning principles such
as standardization but prima facie this principle does not seem to be realizable with the
current definitions.
6.2 Related and future work
Some related works concern notions of realizability for nonstandard arithmetic which are
variants of Kreisel’s modified realizability [6, 9]. These notions of realizability are more
inspired by Nelson’s syntactical approach to nonstandard analysis. In particular, they rely
on translations of formulas inducing conservative extensions of Heyting arithmetic. An
important difference with our work is that we are able to give non-trivial computational
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content to idealization. It could be interesting to better understand the relation between this
approach and the approaches based on Kreisel’s realizability. In particular, we would like to
know whether we can obtain a preservation result for some class of formulas (e.g. internal,
quantifier-free, ∃-free formulas).
It seems that our interpretation with slices can be adapted without difficulty to Krivine’s
classical realizability. In particular, a similar interpretation (but with a very different purpose)
for a classical calculus with a global environment is given in [28]. This setting could possibly
allow to validate new principles by taking advantage of the computational power brought by
control operators.
Finally, similar ideas have been adressed by Aschieri. In [1] the author uses a notion of
state which allows to construct a forcing model. In particular, natural numbers are interpreted
as functions from states to N. Yet, his work does not pay attention to the nonstandard
principles that can be obtained in his setting but rather to forcing. It would be natural
to investigate whether our setting also allows for forcing techniques. This connection with
forcing is reinforced by the fact that in the realm of Krivine’s realizability, which generalizes
Cohen’s forcing, the latter is given a computational content via the addition of a monotone
memory cell to the abstract machine in order to store forcing conditions [21, 26].
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A Proofs of Section 3
A.1 Realizability interpretation
Proof of Proposition 3. By induction on A ∼= A′. The interesting case is for proving the
equality |(∃x.A)→ B|Sρ = |∀x.(A→ B)|Sρ . J
Proof of Theorem 7 (Adequacy). The proof is standard, by case analysis. J
Proof of Corollary 9 (Consistency). If ` t : ⊥, then by Theorem 7 one has t ∈ |⊥| =
|∀X.X| =
⋂
S∈SAT S = ∅. To see that this intersection is indeed empty, one may take for
example S0 = {t ∈ Λ : t → 0} ∈ SAT and S1 = {t ∈ Λ : t → s0} ∈ SAT, and clearly
S0 ∩ S1 = ∅. J
A.2 Introducing value restrictions
I Proposition 45. The following typing rules are adequate:
Γ ` t : A→ B
Γ ` t : {A} 7→ B
(7→I )
Γ ` t : {A} 7→ B Γ ` V : A
Γ ` t V : B
(7→E)
Proof. For the first rule it suffices to see that for any valuation ρ, we have:
{t ∈ Λ : ∀u ∈ |A|Sρ .(t u ∈ |B|Sρ )} ⊆ {t ∈ Λ : ∀V ∈ |A|Sρ .(t V ∈ |B|Sρ )}
For the second one, the proof is analogous to the adequacy of the (→E)-rule. J
I Proposition 46. For any formulas A and B, we have
1. |{∃x.A} 7→ B|Sρ = |∀x.{A} 7→ B|Sρ 2. |{∃X.A} 7→ B|Sρ = |∀X.{A} 7→ B|Sρ
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. J
Proof of Proposition 10. Let t be a term in |∃{N}x.A|Sρ . For any X ∈ SAT and any v ∈
|∀{N}x.(A→ X)|ρ,X 7→X, we have that t v ∈ X. Let us define the set X = {w ∈ Λ : ∃n, u.w →β
(n, u) ∧ u ∈ |A[x := n]|Sρ }, which is obviously saturated. It is clear that λxy.(x, y) ∈
|∀{N}x.(A → X)|ρ,X 7→X since for any n ∈ N and any u ∈ |A[x := n]|Sρ }, it holds that
(λxy.(x, y))nu→β (n, u) ∈ X. We conclude that t (λxy.(x, y))→β (n, u). J
Proof of Proposition 12. Easy realizability proofs by anti-reduction. J
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B Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Stateful computations
We illustrate the need for an evaluation strategy to ensure confluence in the presence of
states by giving a simple example of stateful computation whose result is not the same using
call-by-name and call-by-value strategies.
I Example 47. Let us write x+ y for a term that computes the addition of x and y (such
term is easily definable via rec). Let us define incr0 , set (s get) 0 (which increases the
state and reduces to 0) and t , (λx.(get +x) + x) incr0. If we reduce the argument of the
functions first (call-by-value) we obtain t 0↓1 (λx.(get +x) + x)) 0 1↓1 (get +0) + 0 1↓1 1. In
turn, if we perform the β-reduction without reducing the argument (call-by-name), we get
t 0↓0 (get + incr0) + incr0 0↓1 (get + incr0) + 0 1↓2 get +0 2↓2 2. In the absence of an evaluation
strategy, the system would thus have admitted unsolvable critical pairs.
B.2 Realizability interpretation
Proof of Proposition 17. By a straighforward induction on the structure of A. Observe
for instance that the case st(f) follows from the definition and that the case X(e1, . . . , en)
follows from the fact that, by definition, ρ(X) takes values in SAT. J
Proof of Proposition 18. The proof, by induction on A ∼= A′, is similar to the proof of
Proposition 3. J
Proof of Theorem 21 (Adequacy). The proof, by case analysis, is essentially the same as
the usual adequacy proof for HA2, since none of the instructions involved in the typing
rules allows to change the value of the state. Let us prove the case (→I). Writing Γ for the
typing context, ρ for a valuation closing all the considered formulas, s for the considered
state and σ for a substitution such that (σ; s)  ρ(Γ), by assumption, for any substitution
σ′ such that (σ′; s)  ρ(Γ), x : ρ(A), we have that (σ(t); s) ∈ |B|Sρ . We have to prove that
(λx.σ(t); s) ∈ |A→ B|Sρ . Let then u be a term such that (u; s) ∈ |A|Sρ . By definition, we have
λx.σ(t)u s↓s σ(t)[u/x]. Since σ(t)[u/x] = (σ, x := u)(t) and (σ, x := u; s)  ρ(Γ, x : A), we
obtain (σ(t)[u/x]; s) ∈ |B|Sρ . We conclude that (λx.σ(t)u; s) ∈ |B|Sρ by anti-reduction. J
Proof of Proposition 23. Let X : N→ SAT be a predicate, s ∈ S, f ∈ NS, u0 and uS be
terms, and V be a value such that (u0; s) ∈ X(0), (uS ; s) ∈ |∀Ny.(X(y)→ X(S(y)))|SX 7→X and
(n; s) ∈ |Nat(f)|S. The latter implies that n = f(s). The result follows from the fact that
rec u0 uS n ∈ X(n), which is proved by induction on n. J
B.3 Glueing
Proof of Theorem 26 (Glueing). The proof is by induction on the structure of A. J
Proof of Proposition 27. We consider F : (n1, ..., nk) 7→ |B[x1 := n∗1, ..., xk := n∗k]|Sρ which
defines a function from Nk to SAT. By an easy induction on A, we show using the glueing
theorem and Definition 13 that |A|Sρ,X 7→F = |A[X(x1, ..., xk) := B]|Sρ . J
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B.4 Natural numbers
I Proposition 48. Let f ∈ NS and s ∈ S. If t is a term such that (t; s) ∈ |Nat′(f)|S, then
t λx.x s↓s n, where n = f(s).
Proof. Let us define X , {(t; s′) : t s↓′ sn}. This set is clearly saturated, and it is easy
to see that (λx.x; s) ∈ |{Nat(f)} 7→ X|S (since λx.x n s ↓s n). Therefore, we have that
t ∈ |({Nat(f)} 7→ X)→ X|S and then (t λx.x; s) ∈ X, that is t λx.x s↓s n. J
Proof of Proposition 29. Easy realizability proofs by anti-reduction. J
I Lemma 49. Let s ∈ S and t, u be terms.
1. For any n ∈ N, if u s↓s n, then T t u s↓s t n.
2. For any f ∈ NS, if u s↓s f(s) and (t; s) ∈ |∀{N}x.A(x)|S, then T t u ∈ |A(f)|S.
Proof. The first part is an easy induction on n, and the second part follows from the first
by anti-reduction. J
Proof of Proposition 30. The first three parts are easy, and the fourth one is similar to
Proposition 12 using Lemma 49. J
Proof of Proposition 32. 1. If either f or g is not standard, the result is trivial. Assume
that f and g are standard. If f 6= g, we have |(∀Z.(Z(f) 7→ Z(g))|S = |> 7→ ⊥|S, while
the case f = g is trivial.
2. The result easily follows from Proposition 27. J
B.5 Nonstandard reasoning principles
Proof of Theorem 33 (Transfer). Parts 1 and 4 follow from the glueing theorem, while
parts 2 and 3 (resp. 5, 6) are direct consequences of the first (resp. fourth) part. J
Proof of Proposition 34. Both statements follow by unfolding the definitions. J
Proof of Proposition 35. Let s be a state, n ∈ N and u0, uS be terms and V be a value
such that (u0; s) ∈ |A(0∗)|S, (uS ; s) ∈ |∀sty.(A(y) → A(S(y))|S and (V ; s) ∈ |Nat(n∗)|S.
The latter implies that V = n. The result follows from the fact that rec u0 uS n ∈ |A(n∗)|S,
which is proved by induction on n. J
Proof of Proposition 36 (Overspill). We show that ((λx.(x t, t))u; s)  ∃x.(¬st(x) ∧A(x))
where (u; s)  ∀stx.A(x). Following the proof of part 3 in Theorem 33, we obtain that
(u t; s)  ∀x.A(x) and consequently (u t; s)  A(δ). By ENS0 (Proposition 30), we have
(t; s)  ¬st(δ). Then ((u t, t); s)  ∃x.(¬st(x)∧A(x)) and we conclude by anti-reduction. J
Proof of Proposition 37 (Underspill). Let u and v be terms s.t. (u; s)  ∀x.¬st(x)→ A(x)
and (v; s)  ¬∃stx.A(x). Using Proposition 18, we get that (v; s)  ∀x.((st(x) ∧A(x))→ ⊥),
and by currying (λwz.v (w, z); s)  ∀stx.A(x)→ ⊥.
Since A is internal, by transfer, we obtain that(λz.v (t, z); s)  ∀x.A(x) → ⊥. By the
hypothesis on u and ENS0, we have (u t; s)  A(δ), hence (λz.v (t, z))(u t); s)  ⊥, and we
can conclude by anti-reduction. J
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B.6 Idealization
Proof of Proposition 38 (Diagonalization). Let s be an arbitrary state. Following the proof
of part 2 of Lemma 49, it is clearly enough to prove that (λxy. set y †; s)  ∀{st}y.y ≤ δ (the
rest of the proof is exactly the same replacing ¬st(δ) by ∀{st}y.y ≤ δ). Let n ∈ N and t an
arbitrary term. Then
(λxy. set y t) t n s↓s set n t s↓s
′
t
where s′ = max(n, s). In particular, n ≤ δ(s′) holds, hence (t; s′) ∈ |n ≤ δ|S and we can
conclude by anti-reduction. J
Proof of Lemma 40. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 10. J
Recall that we define ideal , λx.λy.T y (π1(T (x †) get (λwyz.(y, z))) (λyz. set z y).
Proof of Theorem 41 (Idealization). Let s be any state and let u be a term such that
(u; s) ∈ |∀{st}n.∃{st}x.∀{st}y.(y ≤ n→ R(x, y))|S. By part 2 of Lemma 49, this entails that
(T (u †) get; s) ∈ |∃{st}x.∀{st}y.(y ≤ s→ R(x, y))|Sρ .
By Lemma 40, we know that there exists a natural number ps ∈ N and a term vs ∈ Λ
such that T (u †) get (λzxy.(x, y)) s ↓s (ps, vs) and (vs; s) ∈ |∀{st}y.(y ≤ s → R(ps, y))|S.
The latter implies that for any m ∈ N such that m ≤ s and any term t, it holds that
(vs tm t; s) ∈ |R(ps,m)|S and hence R(ps,m) holds (otherwise |R(ps,m)|s = ∅).
Consider the (nonstandard) individual τ ∈ NS defined by τ(s) = ps . We have
ideal u s↓s λy.T y (π1(T (u †) get (λwyz.(y, z)))) (λyz. set z y)
hence, by part 2 of Lemma 49, to conclude by anti-reduction it suffices to prove that
1. π1(T (u †) get (λwyz.(y, z))) s↓s τ(s). Indeed, we know that this term reduces as follows:
π1(T (u †) get (λwyz.(y, z))) s↓s π1(ps, vs) s↓s ps
and by definition τ(s) = ps.
2. (λyz. set z y; s)  ∀{st}y.R(τ, y). To prove this, it suffices to show that for any m ∈ N
and any t ∈ Λ, we have ((λyz. set z y) tm; s)  R(τ,m∗). With s′ , max(s,m), we have
that (λyz. set z y) tm s↓s set mt s↓s′ t. By construction, since m ≤ s′, we know that
R(τ(s′),m) holds, hence (t; s′) ∈ |R(τ(s′),m)|Sρ and we conclude by anti-reduction. J
C Realizability up to U
Proof of Proposition 42. Follows from the fact that for any nonstandard f ∈ NS, any n ∈ N
and any s ∈ S, there exists s′ ∈ S such that s′ > s and n < f(s′). The result then follows
by anti-reduction from the fact that loop+ s↓s′ loop+. J
We give here the quotiented interpretation referred to in Section 6.1.
I Definition 50 (Realizability up to U). The interpretation of a formula A together with a
valuation ρ is the set |A|∗ρ defined inductively according to the following clauses:
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|st(f)|∗ρ ,
{
Λ if f ∼= n∗, for some n ∈ N
∅ otherwise
|X(e1, . . . , en)|∗ρ , {t ∈ Λ : {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ ρ(X)@(Je1Kρ, . . . , JenKρ)} ∈ U}
|{Nat(e)} 7→ A|∗ρ , {t ∈ Λ : {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ |{Nat(e)} 7→ A|Sρ } ∈ U}}
|A→ B|∗ρ , {t ∈ Λ : {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ |A→ B|Sρ } ∈ U}
|A1 ∧A2|∗ρ , {t ∈ Λ : {s ∈ S : (π1(t); s) ∈ |A1|Sρ ∧ (π2(t); s) ∈ |A2|Sρ } ∈ U}



















We write t * A if t ∈ |A|∗.
As explained in Section 6.1, this definition is meant to satisfy a counterpart of Łoś ’
theorem in our setting.
Proof of Theorem 44 (Łoś ’ theorem). The proof goes by induction on the structure of A.
In the cases {Nat(e)} 7→ A, X(e1, . . . , en), A → B, A ∨ B and A ∧ B, the result follows
directly from the definitions. The proof for quantifiers is similar to the usual proof of Łoś ’
theorem, we only give here the case of the existential quantifier.
Case ∃x.A By the induction hypothesis, we have that for any f ∈ NS,
|A|∗ρ,x 7→f = {t : {s ∈ S : t; s ∈ |A|Sρ,x 7→f} ∈ U}
By glueing, we have that |A|Sρ,x 7→f = |A
s|sρ,x7→f = |A
s|sρ,x7→(f(s))∗ . We want to prove that for
any t ∈ Λ
∃f ∈ NS.t ∈ |A|∗ρ,x 7→f iff {s ∈ S : t; s ∈ |∃x.A|Sρ } ∈ U
Observe that, by glueing, the right-hand side is equivalent to {s ∈ S : ∃n ∈ N.t ∈
|A|sρ,x 7→n∗} ∈ U .
⇒c If there exists f ∈ NS such that t ∈ |A|∗ρ,x7→f . We easily see that
{s ∈ S : t ∈ |A|sρ,x 7→(f(s))∗} ⊆ {s ∈ S : ∃n ∈ N.t ∈ |A|sρ,x7→n∗}
hence we can conclude by upwards closure of the ultrafilter.
⇐c Assume that E , {s ∈ S : ∃n ∈ N.t ∈ |A|sρ,x7→n∗} ∈ U
For any s ∈ E, using countable choice we can pick an integer ns such that t ∈ |A|sρ,x7→n∗s .
We may then define the function g ∈ NS by g(s) , ns if s ∈ E, 0 otherwise. By definition,
E ⊆ {s ∈ S : t ∈ |A|sρ,x7→(g(s))∗}, hence this set belongs to U by upwards closure. Therefore
we can conclude by induction hypothesis that t ∈ |A|∗ρ,x 7→f . J
I Proposition 51. For any internal formulas A and B, and any valuation ρ closing both A
and B, we have |A→ B|∗ρ ⊆ {t : ∀u ∈ |A|∗ρ.t u ∈ |B|∗ρ}.
Proof. For any term t and any formula A, let us denote by SAt the set {s ∈ S : (t; s) ∈ |A|Sρ }.
Let t ∈ Λ be such that SA→Bt ∈ U and u ∈ |A|∗ρ. By hypothesis, SAu ∈ U . We need to show
that tu ∈ |B|∗ρ. Again, for any s ∈ SA→Bt ∩ SAu ∈ U , we have tu; s ∈ |B|Sρ . By upwards
closure, we deduce that {s : (tu; s) ∈ |B|Sρ } ∈ U , hence tu ∈ |B|∗ρ, and the result follows from
Theorem 44. J
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I Remark 52. One could have been tempted to define the truth value |A→ B|∗ρ as the set of
terms t such that for any u ∈ |A|∗ρ, t u ∈ |B|∗ρ, as is usual in realizability. Unfortunately, such
a definition is incompatible with Theorem 44, as the other inclusion in Proposition 51 does
not hold. To see this, let A , Nat′(τ) and B , ⊥ where τ is a non-computable function7
τ : S→ N for which there is no term u such that ∀s.u s↓s τ(s). By construction, we have that
|A|∗ = ∅, so that obviously for any u ∈ |Nat′(τ)|∗, the function (λx.x)u ∈ |⊥|∗. Yet, for each
state s the truth value |Nat′(τ)|Sρ is not empty (it contains at least (n, s), for n = τ(s)) and
therefore (λx.x; s) /∈ |Nat′(τ)→ ⊥|Sρ (since for any (u; s) ∈ |Nat′(τ)|S, (λx.x u; s) /∈ |⊥|∗).
We want to point out that Remark 52 highlights the “counter-intuitive” peculiarities of the
interpretation up to U with respect to the quotient in the Lightstone-Robinson construction.
The latter indeed appears to be more regular, seemingly for two main reasons. First, as
we highlight in Section 4, in the stateful interpretation the set instruction allows terms to
change the value of the states during computations, and thus of the slices. This phenomenon
does not occur in the Lightstone-Robinson construction where slices of the product are
complety isolated between them. Second, while the Lightstone-Robinson construction is
based on Boolean-valued models, realizability interpretations associate to each formula a set
of realizers (instead of one unique Boolean). Besides, the use of relativized quantifiers (for
instance in the statement for idealization) forces us to use only computable functions8.
7 To that end, one can for instance consider the function τ which to each s ∈ S associates the smallest
natural number n ∈ N such that there is no term of size smaller than or equal to s that computes n the
state s: τ(s) , inf{n ∈ N : ¬∃t.|t| ≤ s ∧ t s↓s n} .
8 This is the reason why, for instance, the premise of idealization needs to be restricted to the existence
of a standard natural number x, instead of any natural number as is usually the case.
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